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Note
Treating the Disease or Punishing the Criminal?:
Effectively Using Drug Court Sanctions To Treat
Substance Use Disorder and Decrease Criminal
Conduct
Caitlinrose Fisher*
In 1969, forty-four percent of individuals entering the District of Columbia jail system tested positive for heroin, a statis1
tic used to link substance use to crime. Two years later, President Nixon declared a “war on drugs,” attempting to address
2
substance abuse and its negative impact on society. Despite
the ongoing “war on drugs,” thirty-five years after its inauguration over half of all state inmates abused drugs the year before
3
their admission to prison. The lack of change in the correlation
between drug use and criminal activity in those thirty-five
years suggests that traditional threats of punishment and probation do not deter drug use by the majority of individuals
* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010,
University of Wisconsin-Madison. I am deeply grateful to Professor Kevin
Reitz for his invaluable assistance and feedback throughout this process.
Thank you also to Professor Kristin Hickman, Professor Robert Stein, and Professor Jessica Clarke, for their mentorship, guidance, and encouragement
throughout law school. I would also like to thank my family, Patricia
Hoolihan, Chris Fisher, and Kelly Fisher, and my husband Jacob Held, for
their constant support of my personal and professional dreams. Copyright ©
2014 by Caitlinrose Fisher.
1. See Thirty Years of America’s Drug War, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs
.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron (last visited Nov. 2, 2014); see also
JANINE M. ZWEIG ET AL., URBAN INST., 2 THE MULTI-SITE ADULT DRUG COURT
EVALUATION: WHAT’S HAPPENING WITH DRUG COURTS? A PORTRAIT OF ADULT
DRUG COURTS IN 2004, at 7 (Janine M. Zweig et al. eds., 2011) (“A large and
impressive research literature shows that substance use and abuse are linked
to crime and criminal behavior.”).
2. Thirty Years of America’s Drug War, supra note 1.
3. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Methamphetamine Use
Increasing Among State and Federal Prisoners (Oct. 11, 2006), http://www.bjs
.gov/content/pub/press/dudsfp04pr.cfm (finding fifty-three percent of state inmates and forty-five percent of federal inmates had abused or been addicted to
drugs the year prior to admission to prison).
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struggling with addiction. Something other than the President’s war on drugs and long periods of jail time was needed to
4
address the correlation between addiction and incarceration. A
possible solution emerged in Miami in 1989, with the first drug
5
court.
Evidence suggests that drug courts can successfully reduce
drug use and criminal behavior, both during and after a de6
fendant’s drug court participation. Due to its apparent success,
the drug court model has been replicated in a variety of “problem-solving courts,” which address conditions, such as alcohol7
ism and mental illness, that contribute to criminal activity.
Drug courts obtain results by integrating treatment, close supervision, frequent drug testing, sanctions for court violations,
8
and incentives for compliant behavior. Although drug courts
achieve desirable results for both the participants and society
as a whole, the rules governing responses to court violations
vary greatly among courts and are not grounded in recent med9
ical definitions of substance use disorder. The lack of consistent administration of sanctions and termination from drug
courts leaves appellate courts with little guidance when field10
ing challenges from drug court participants. Drug courts are
filling a unique and essential niche in the criminal justice system yet are vulnerable to criticism because of this procedural
11
inconsistency.
4. See JEFF TAUBER & C. WEST HUDDLESTON, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST.,
DUI/DRUG COURTS: DEFINING A NATIONAL STRATEGY, at vii (Mar. 1999) (noting the success of drug courts in “slow[ing] the revolving door” of the criminal
justice system).
5. JEFFREY TAUBER & KATHLEEN R. SNAVELY, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST.,
DRUG COURTS: A RESEARCH AGENDA 1 (Apr. 1999).
6. Id. at 2.
7. See Mitchell B. Mackinem & Paul Higgins, Introduction to PROBLEMSOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? vii–x (Paul Higgins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 2009); see also TAUBER & HUDDLESTON,
supra note 4, at vii (recommending the development of DUI courts based on
the drug court model).
8. TAUBER & HUDDLESTON, supra note 4, at 4.
9. See TAUBER & SNAVELY, supra note 5, at 6 (recognizing the need for
additional research on rules governing sanctions and incentives).
10. E.g., Washington v. Cassill-Skilton, 94 P.3d 407, 410 (Wash. Ct. App.
2004).
11. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 Stan.
L. & Pol’y Rev. 417, 418 (2009) (“[D]rug courts . . . rest upon a series of controversial methodological assumptions underlying the selection of the court as
the locus of treatment provision and management. The court’s methodology
implicates political issues of coercion and freedom . . . .”).
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Due to their continued expansion, it appears as though
drug courts are here to stay. Even assuming, however, that
drug courts are a normatively positive alternative to traditional
probation and punishment, there inevitably will be individuals
who cannot resist the impulse to use drugs and thus violate the
conditions of the drug court. Although scholarship has focused
on the structure of the drug court, there is currently a lack of
scholarship regarding how to administer the procedures in drug
court, assuming the courts’ structure is jurisprudentially
sound. There is also a lack of scholarship regarding how to best
respond to those individuals who are unable to comply with the
conditions of the court. This Note fills that current gap in
scholarship, addressing a specific type of drug court: a court
that only admits participants with diagnosed severe substance
use disorder; a court that admits participants based on their
12
disease, rather than the crimes they have committed; and a
court with a medical professional or treatment representative
as a member of the drug court team, present to inform the
13
judge of the medical nature of certain court violations.
This Note argues that sanction administration in drug
courts can and should be different from the processes in other
criminal proceedings and traditional probation because of the
need to treat participants’ underlying disease. Part I discusses
medical advances in addiction studies, the evolution of drug
courts, procedures in those courts, and recent probation reform.
Part II analyzes innovations in probation and drug courts, specifically the procedures for responding to probation and drug
court violations. Part III introduces a procedure for administer12. When discussing model drug courts throughout, I will refer to them
simply as drug courts. I limit my analysis to that specific type of drug court
because it is limited by the severity of the disease of the participant. As further developed below, my proposal requires comparing the nature of the disease with the nature of the violation when determining drug court sanctions.
Thus, although this Note’s solution could be applied in other contexts, it will
be most relevant and applicable for drug courts that restrict their participants
to those diagnosed with severe substance use disorder. Currently only thirtyeight percent of drug courts are limited to those diagnosed as “addicted” or
“dependent.” ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 27.
13. Treatment is recognized as a “primary function” of drug courts and is
the major activity drug court participants must participate in. Id. at 48.
This Note also assumes that the two primary goals of drug courts are
rehabilitation and crime prevention. Drug courts present a unique opportunity
to achieve both goals, because treating the underlying disease of substance use
disorder increases the likelihood of rehabilitation and reintegration into society and decreases the likelihood of future crimes and harm to society. See infra
note 37 and accompanying text.
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ing sanctions in drug courts that incorporates medical
knowledge of substance use disorder and the benefits such a
system would have on not only court participants but also appellate courts. Additionally, Part III responds to potential concerns with this Note’s proposed solution. This Note ultimately
proposes that the procedure for administering sanctions should
vary based upon whether the sanction is in response to a disease-driven act or a non-disease-driven act, to better reflect and
uphold drug courts’ unique role in treating severe substance
use disorder, an underlying cause of criminal activity.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF DRUG COURTS AND PROBATION
REFORM
Drug courts emerged to address addiction and its correlation to criminal activity. In order to understand the purpose of
drug courts within the broader context of probation and sentencing, it is important to first understand the disease of substance use disorder, the history of drug courts, and the differences between drug courts and traditional probation. Section A
begins by discussing the disease of substance use disorder,
commonly referred to as addiction. Section B addresses the
emergence of drug courts, including their procedures, structures, and the way they integrate an understanding of substance use disorder into the disposition of a case. Finally, Section C discusses some of the challenges facing probation and
recent innovations in probation.
A. THE NATURE OF ADDICTION
Substance use disorder, commonly referred to as addiction,
14
is a “misunderstood and deadly disease.” Despite the beliefs of
15
16
some skeptics and Supreme Court dicta, in 2011 the Ameri14. Marvin D. Seppala, Addiction: The Disease That Lies, CNN HEALTH
(July 16, 2013, 6:02 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/15/health/addiction
-relapse-cory-monteith; see also Peter W. Kalivas & Charles O’Brien, Drug
Addiction
as
a
Pathology
of
Staged
Neuroplasticity,
33
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 166, 166 (2008) (“The last 20 years of research
has made it clear that addiction to drugs is based on pathological changes in
brain function produced by repeated pharmacological insult to the brain circuits that regulate how a person interprets and behaviorally responds to motivationally relevant stimuli.”).
15. See, e.g., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, RETHINKING DRINKING: ALCOHOL
AND YOUR HEALTH, NIH Pub. No. 13-3770, at 1 (2010) (suggesting that most
people can quit drinking without professional treatment); Morris B. Hoffman,
The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1469–74 (2000) (summarizing
criticisms of the disease theory of addiction); Stanton Peele, Ain’t Misbehavin’:
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can Society of Addiction Medicine redefined addiction as a
17
brain disease, as opposed to a social or behavioral disorder.
Additionally, in 2013 the American Psychiatric Association released the Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), containing new nomencla18
ture and criteria for diagnosing addiction. As currently
defined by leading medical literature, addiction, or substance
use disorder, is a “primary, chronic disease of brain reward . . .
and related circuitry. . . . characterized by inability to consist19
ently abstain.” The DSM-V lists eleven diagnostic criteria for
substance use disorder, divided into four categories:
Addiction Has Become an All-Purpose Excuse, 29 SCIENCES 14, 16 (1989)
(“[R]epeated attempts to prove that addiction is a clear-cut medical condition
have been, at best, inconclusive.”); David J. Hanson, Is Alcoholism a Disease?,
PROBS.
&
SOLUTIONS,
http://www2.potsdam.edu/alcohol/
ALCOHOL
Controversies/Is-Alcoholism-a-Disease.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2014) (arguing that the medical definition of addiction is sociological and fluctuates, and
the disease model was put forward to “provide[] an excuse and relieve[] [addicts] of responsibility for their behaviors”).
16. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1988) (discussing the
split of medical authority regarding whether alcoholism is a disease, and stating that there is little evidence that alcohol use is involuntary and that addicts
are not responsible for their use). It should be noted that this case is over fifteen years old, and therefore lacks the benefit of medical research regarding
addiction.
17. Addiction Now Defined as Brain Disorder, Not Behavior Problem,
LIVE SCIENCE (Aug. 15, 2011, 10:32 AM), http://www.livescience.com/15563
-addiction-defined-brain-disease.html. The American Society of Addiction
Medicine redefined addiction after a four-year study that involved over eighty
experts. Id.
18. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5 Implementation and Support,
DSM-5 DEV., http://www.dsm5.org (last visited Nov. 27, 2014) (released May
2013); see also Charles O’Brien, Addiction and Dependence in DSM-V, 106
ADDICTION 866, 867 (2010) (discussing changes to the definition of addiction in
DSM-V).
19. Am. Soc’y of Addiction Med., Public Policy Statement: Definition of
Addiction 1 (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.asam.org/docs/publicy-policy
-statements/1definition_of_addiction_long_4-11.pdf; see AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-5
483 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V], available at http://dsm
.psychiatryonline.org/content.aspx?bookid=556&sectionid=41101782#1034405
77 (“An important characteristic of substance use disorders is an underlying
change in brain circuits that may persist beyond detoxification, particularly in
individuals with severe disorders.”); see also Alan I. Leshner, Addiction Is a
Brain Disease, and It Matters, 278 SCIENCE 45, 46 (1997) (arguing that because addiction is tied to changes in brain structure and function, it is primarily a brain disease); Seppala, supra note 14 (“[A]ddiction is a brain disease . . .
. [that] resides in the limbic system, a subconscious part of our brain that is
involved with memory, emotion and reward.”). But see Gene M. Heyman, Is
Addiction a Chronic, Relapsing Disease?, in DRUG ADDICTION AND DRUG POL-
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(A) Impaired Control
(1) consume more than intended;
(2) desire to cut down but unsuccessful at doing so;
(3) great deal of time revolves around substance and use;
(4) cravings;
(B) Social Impairment
(5) failure to fulfill obligations;
(6) continued use despite persistent social or interpersonal problems;
(7) give up important social activities to use;
(C) Risky Use
(8) use when physically hazardous;
(9) use despite physical and psychological problem exacerbated by use;
(D) Pharmacological Criteria
(10) increased tolerance;
20
(11) withdrawal.
An individual experiencing six or more simultaneous
symptoms—described by DSM-V as an individual who chroni21
cally relapses—has “severe” substance use disorder. Because
substance use disorder is a brain disease, treatment must re22
verse or compensate for brain changes. Also, because substance use disorder is a chronic disease, relapses are the “norm”
23
in early recovery.
Substance use disorder not only affects the drug user’s
health and functionality but also affects society as a whole.

ICY 81, 107 (Philip B. Heymann & William N. Brownsberger eds., 2001) (arguing that referring to addiction as a brain disease minimizes or does not account for those who quit and recover from their addiction).
20. DSM-V, supra note 19, at 481–84.
21. Severe substance use disorder is similar to the term “addiction.” The
term “addiction,” however, was omitted from DSM-V because of its uncertain
definition and negative connotations. Id. at 485. Throughout this Note, I use
the term “addiction” and “severe substance use disorder” interchangeably.
22. Leshner, supra note 19, at 46; see also SHELLI B. ROSSMAN ET AL., URBAN INST., 3 THE MULTI-SITE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: THE DRUG
COURT EXPERIENCE 40 (Shelli B. Rossman et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter
ROSSMAN ET AL., THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE] (discussing the complexity of
treatment and the importance of addressing both the underlying addiction and
how to become a functioning member of society).
23. Leshner, supra note 19, at 46.
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Many addicts commit crimes to finance their addiction or
25
commit crimes while under the influence of a substance. Individuals suffering from addiction flood traditional corrections
systems, with high rates of recidivism the norm—criminal behavior and its resultant costs to society are thus intertwined
26
with severe substance use disorder. Drug courts emerged to
relieve the traditional corrections system and address both
problems in one forum.
B. DRUG COURTS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF SANCTIONS IN
THOSE COURTS
The war on drugs and subsequent implementation of zero
tolerance approaches to drug use dramatically increased ar27
rests and incarceration for drug offenses as early as the 1960s.
28
Not only was the incarceration increase costly for taxpayers
but it also resulted in “increased poverty, neglected families,
and . . . [other] problems for already disadvantaged neighbor29
hoods.” Because traditional courts lacked effective tools to
deal with the underlying nature of severe substance use disorder, drug courts emerged to fill the missing niche in the correc30
tional system.
24. William N. Brownsberger, Drug Users and Drug Dealers, in DRUG
ADDICTION AND DRUG POLICY 51, 67–68 (Philip B. Heymann & William N.
Brownsberger eds., 2001).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., DOUG MCVAY ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., TREATMENT OR
INCARCERATION: NATIONAL AND STATE FINDINGS ON THE EFFICACY AND COST
SAVINGS OF DRUG TREATMENT VERSUS IMPRISONMENT 6–10 (2004), available
at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/04-01_rep_
mdtreatmentorincarceration_ac-dp.pdf.
27. See Greg Berman, Problem-Solving Justice and the Moment of Truth,
in PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 1, 8
(Paul Higgins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 2009); Richard C. Boldt, A Circumspect Look at Problem-Solving Courts, in PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS:
JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 13, 25 (Paul Higgins & Mitchell B.
Mackinem eds., 2009) (finding that the war on drugs impacted the case load
and day-to-day functioning of traditional courts).
28. See Berman, supra note 27, at 8 (estimating that United States taxpayers could save forty-six billion dollars if addicted defendants in the criminal justice system were linked to treatment instead of incarceration).
29. JOANN MILLER & DONALD C. JOHNSON, PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS: A
MEASURE OF JUSTICE 32 (2009).
30. See Boldt, supra note 27, at 13; see also John A. Bozza, Benevolent Behavior Modification: Understanding the Nature and Limitations of ProblemSolving Courts, 17 WIDENER L. J. 97, 104 (2007) (arguing that two aspects of
drug courts differentiate them from traditional probation: (1) the systematic
use of behavioral consequences; and (2) the consistent involvement of judges to
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Drug courts are special dockets within a court system that
31
serve addicted individuals. Most require both an eligible
32
33
charge and a clinical assessment to participate. Participants
undergo random drug and alcohol testing, some form of treatment, and intensive (highly structured and supervised) proba34
35
tion. Since the first drug court was implemented in 1989, not
only has the number of drug courts greatly expanded but problem-solving courts for a variety of anti-social conditions, such
as alcoholism and mental illness, have also been implement36
ed. The proliferation of drug courts and problem-solving
courts is due in large part to reduced recidivism rates and net
37
costs to the government, although skeptics have challenged
the empirical validity of statistics regarding drug court efficadispense consequences). But see Hoffman, supra note 15, at 1440 (arguing that
jurisdictions rushed to implement drug courts without seriously considering
their effectiveness).
31. See, e.g., WEST HUDDLESTON & DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L DRUG
COURT INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG
COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 7
(2011).
32. Eligible charges may include nonviolent drug offenses, theft, or other
crimes stemming from the participant’s underlying addiction. Id.
33. ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 3. An eligible charge most often means
a non-violent offense. Id.
34. HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 31, at 7.
35. TAUBER & SNAVELY, supra note 5, at 1.
36. See Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 7, at ix (noting the existence of
3,204 problem-solving courts and 2,147 drug courts by 2007); see also TAUBER
& HUDDLESTON, supra note 4, at x (expanding drug court philosophy to DUI
courts in 1998). Problem-solving courts have been defined as “[L]ocal courts
that seek to remedy detrimental community conditions through sustained attention and . . . therapeutic interventions with individual offenders who experience debilitating personal conditions.” Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 7, at
vii. Although there are various models for drug courts, the majority (fifty-eight
percent) follow a post-plea model. HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 31, at
1.
37. See TAUBER & SNAVELY, supra note 5, at 2 (finding drug courts both
successful at engaging and retaining felony offenders and cost-effective); David
J. Hanson, DWI Courts: Effectively Addressing Drunk Driving, in PROBLEMSOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 73, 84 (Paul
Higgins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 2009) (finding DUI court participants
four times less likely to receive another DUI than non-DUI court participants);
Mitchell B. Mackinem & Paul Higgins, Adult Drug Courts: A Hope Realized?,
in PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 33,
41 (Paul Higgins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 2009) (finding an average reduction of thirty-two percent in recidivism as compared to non-drug court participants). See generally HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 31, at 9–10
(synthesizing various research on the effectiveness of drug courts at both reducing crime and saving the government money).
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38

cy. The growth in drug courts may also reflect a broader transition from punitive and retributive punishment to therapeutic
39
and restorative justice, reflected in the most recent drafts of
40
the Model Penal Code. Research repeatedly focuses on reduc41
tions in recidivism and cost saving to the government. But the
National Drug Court Institute recognizes that there is less research regarding the structural design of drug court programs
42
and the application of sanctions to court participants.
Principles such as collaboration, enhanced information,
community engagement, individualized justice, accountability,
43
and treatment outcomes universally guide drug courts, but
the implementation of courts varies dramatically state-to44
state. To ensure participant accountability and eventual
graduation from—or completion of—drug courts, all drug courts
administer graduated sanctions, a system of increasingly ad45
verse consequences for subsequent violations, to respond to
46
violations of the drug court contract. Sanctions are defined as
penalties, “specified or in the form of moral pressure, that act[]
47
to ensure compliance or conformity.” The entire drug court
38. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 15.
39. See Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 7, at viii; see also MILLER &
JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 19 (noting that problem-solving courts derive from
multiple legal positions, including legal pragmatism, therapeutic jurisprudence, law-and-literature, and legal realism). Although problem-solving courts
arguably derive from many legal positions, this Note assumes that therapeutic
and restorative justice are the guiding principles of problem-solving courts.
40. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, reporters’ intro. at xx-xxiii (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014) (on file with author).
41. See, e.g., MCVAY, supra note 26, at 6–10.
42. TAUBER & SNAVELY, supra note 5, at 5, 6 (noting the need to assess
“the structural design of drug court programs” and the varying application and
rules regarding sanctions).
43. See Berman, supra note 27, at 2–3 (listing underlying principles);
Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 7, at viii (discussing the importance of collaboration).
44. See TAUBER & SNAVELY, supra note 5, at 1.
45. Adele Harrell & John Roman, Reducing Drug Use and Crime Among
Offenders: The Impact of Graduated Sanctions, 31 J. DRUG ISSUES 207, 209
(2001). For a history of the meaning of the term graduated sanctions see Faye
S. Taxman et al., Graduated Sanctions: Stepping Into Accountable Systems
and Offenders, 79 PRISON J. 182, 184–86 (1999).
46. See TAUBER & SNAVELY, supra note 5, at 6 (“The application of sanctions and incentives is universal among drug courts . . . .”); Christine H. Lindquist et al., Sanctions and Rewards in Drug Court Programs: Implementation,
Perceived Efficacy, and Decision Making, 36 J. DRUG ISSUES 119, 120 (2006).
47. AM. CORR. ASS’N, RECLAIMING OFFENDER ACCOUNTABILITY: INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS FOR PROBATION AND PAROLE VIOLATORS 5 (Edward E.
Rhine ed., 1993).
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team—including the judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, probation officer, and treatment liaison—typically determines sanc48
tions. Although sanctions are a part of every drug court’s pro49
gram, the “rules governing their application vary.”
The diversity of sanctions used in drug courts exceeds
50
sanctions traditionally used in courts, probation, and parole.
Although all drug courts rely on some form of graduated sanctions, potential sanctions range from a verbal reprimand or
writing an essay to civil contempt, jail time, or termination
51
from the court. In particular, the use of jail as a sanction varies considerably, with some programs recommending no more
than five days in jail, others no more than thirty, and many
52
more with no ceiling on jail time. This can lead to arbitrary or
excessive punishment, undermining drug courts’ validity and
53
therapeutic efficacy.
Another variation between drug courts is the predictability
of sanctions. In some drug courts, the participation contract
54
outlines violations and the sanctions they trigger. In many
48.
49.
50.
51.

Lindquist et al., supra note 46, at 139.
TAUBER & SNAVELY, supra note 5, at 6.
Lindquist et al., supra note 46, at 141.
See id. at 130 tbl.3; List of Incentives and Sanctions, NATIONAL DRUG
COURT RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.ndcrc.org/content/list-incentives-and
-sanctions (last visited Nov. 2, 2014); Sanctions and Incentives from Operational Drug Courts Throughout the Nation, AM. U. JUST. PROGRAMS OFF.,
http://jpo.wrlc.org//handle/11204/2388 (follow “3022.pdf” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).
52. See, e.g., Denver Drug Court Incentives and Sanctions Guidelines,
NAT’L DRUG CT. RESOURCE CENTER, http://live-ndcrc-nadcp.gotpantheon.com/
content/denver-drug-court-incentives-and-sanctions-guidelines (last visited
Nov. 2, 2014) (thirty days maximum); List of Incentives and Sanctions, supra
note 51 (five days maximum); RHODE ISLAND ADULT DRUG COURT, CONTRACT,
http://www.courts.ri.gov/PublicResources/forms/Superior%20Court%20Forms/
Adult%20Drug%20Court%20-%20Contract.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2014) (no
maximum jail time).
53. See, e.g., This American Life: Very Tough Love (Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/sites/default/files/TAL430_transcript
.pdf (describing a particularly punitive drug court, where the judge imposed
sanctions and jail sentences far more severe than the original charge permitted).
54. See, e.g., DRUG COURT: DEFENSE PACKET MATERIALS, available at
http://www.co.clark.wa.us/courts/documents/DRUGCOURTOPT-INPACKET
.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2014) (differentiating sanctions based on the number of positive urinalyses and the phase of the drug court program the participant is in); see also Jeremy Travis, But They All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry, SENT’G & CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 5 (May
2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181413.pdf (describing
drug court contract with specified sanctions).
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others, however, the drug court agreement (or “contract”) is silent on when sanctions will be imposed, leaving broad discretion with the judge and team to determine sanctions on a case55
by-case basis. Both appellate courts and academics have challenged the variability in sanctions and termination from the
court, currently undermining the legitimacy of problem-solving
56
courts. Ultimately, this variability raises the question: What
procedure is best for both the participant and society as a
whole?
C. CHALLENGES FACING TRADITIONAL PROBATION
The need for probation violation reform has been recognized in traditional probation system. Sanctions are also an increasingly key component of probation and parole, and innovations in probation and parole can inform drug court procedures.
Probation and parole violations contribute from thirty to eighty
percent of new prison intakes and account for more than half of
57
the growth in the correctional population since 1990. Probation revocation policies therefore have a “significant impact on
55. See Dunson v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 847, 849 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001)
(“Decisions to terminate from Drug Court are made on a case-by-case basis
and are not made according to precise guidelines.”); DRUG COURT AGREEMENT,
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., available at http://www.montgomerycountymd
.gov/circuitcourt/resources/files/drugcourtagreementrevised.pdf
(silent
on
sanctions); see also William M. Burdon et al., Drug Courts and Contingency
Management, 31 J. DRUG ISSUES 73, 78 (2001) (criticizing the imbalance between sanctions and rewards in active drug courts); Lindquist et al., supra
note 46, at 133 (finding that the majority of judges preferred individualization
of sanctions, based in part upon the participant’s compliance with the spirit of
the program and commitment to recovery).
56. Harold Pollack et al., How To Make Drug Court Work, WASH. POST
(Apr. 26, 2013 11:14 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/
2013/04/26/how-to-make-drug-courts-work (arguing that sanctions can include
lengthy terms of confinement and exceed traditional sentences). But see State
v. Perkins, 661 S.E.2d 366, 367 (S.C. 2008) (stating that the state supreme
court has no authority to “evaluate and assess the manner in which the [drug
court] administrators execute the rules and regulations of the [drug court]”).
57. See, e.g., Faye S. Taxman et al., Graduated Sanctions: Stepping Into
Accountable Systems and Offenders, 79 PRISON J. 182, 183 (1999); Angela
Hawken & Mark Kleiman, Managing Drug Involved Probationers with Swift
and Certain Sanctions: Evaluating Hawaii’s HOPE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE,
(Dec. 2, 2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
229023.pdf; see also Sadhbh Walshe, Probation and Parole: A Study in Criminal Justice Dysfunction, GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2012 3:50 30 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/apr/26/probation
-parole-study-dysfunction (finding that probation and parole violations accounted for over one-third of prison admissions in 2005, half due to new crimes
and half due to technical violations of terms of release).
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58

[the] prison population.” As the probation system lacks efficient means to adjudicate single violations, the imposition of
sanctions rarely occurs in traditional probation, and when im59
posed, sanctions tend to be “too rare and too delayed.” When
probationers can get away with violating the terms of probation
without immediate consequence, they are less likely to comply
60
with those conditions. Because over half of probationers fail to
comply with the terms of their release, there has been a movement toward graduated sanctions for violations of probation
61
conditions.
Graduated sanctions were introduced to increase compliance in traditional probation. The key deterrence principles of
“certainty, swiftness, and progressiveness” guide graduated
62
sanctions. A predetermined sanctions “menu,” which forms a
63
behavioral contract, outlines and mandates given sanctions.
The reduced discretion increases the certainty of the sanctions.
In 2004, Hawaii became the first state to implement significant
64
probation reform, through Project HOPE. Project HOPE is a
high-intensity supervision program characterized by swift, pre65
dictable, and immediate sanctions for detected violations. Project HOPE has been referred to as a coerced abstinence program and is not as therapeutically focused or intensive as drug
66
courts. Project HOPE includes five significant innovations in
the field of probation:
(1) an initial warning hearing, which informs participants
each violation will result in jail time;

58. AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 47, at vi.
59. Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 57, at 6; see also AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 47, at 6 (“[T]he messages we send can make all the difference between effective supervision and setting offenders up for failure.”); Steven S.
Alm, A New Continuum for Court Supervision, 91 OR. L. REV. 1181, 1184
(2013) (suggesting that probation officers often delay administering sanctions
until the offender can be characterized as “not amenable to probation”); Taxman et al., supra note 45, at 189 (arguing that when violations are not immediately addressed, offenders are less likely to adhere to conditions of probation).
60. See Taxman et al., supra note 45, at 189.
61. Id. at 184–85.
62. Id. at 187.
63. Id. at 190.
64. Hope Probation, HAWAII ST. JUDICIARY, http://www.courts.state.hi.us/
special_projects/hope/about_hope_probation.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2014);
see also Alm, supra note 59, at 1185.
65. Id.
66. See HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 31, at 17.
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(2) swift hearings following violations;
(3) treatment for those who cannot stop using drugs or al67
cohol on their own;
(4) the ability of judges to supervise large numbers of probationers; and
68
(5) targeting the toughest populations.
Participation in Project HOPE reduces the likelihood of recidi69
vism and probation revocation. Due to these successes, Project
HOPE currently serves as a model for probation reform.
Traditionally, punitive punishment has not been effective
at reducing incarceration rates for individuals on probation or
70
individuals struggling with severe substance use disorder.
Fortunately, the movement toward graduated sanctions for
probation violations, and diverting high-risk populations into
drug courts, has proven that it is possible to lower the rates of
incarceration and recidivism in historically highly incarcerated
71
populations. Drug courts currently employ graduated sanctions and progressive punishment, but not in a uniform way. A
challenge facing drug courts is what sanction policy will facilitate recovery and reintegration for the largest possible number
of offenders, without undermining public safety, and whether
that sanction policy should be transparent and uniform. This
challenge, and a possible solution for drug courts, is addressed
below.

67. It is important to note that treatment is not a core component of Project HOPE because Project HOPE is not specifically geared towards those who
are addicted. Therefore, although parts of Project HOPE may inform sanctions
in a drug court, the two systems are distinct and serve different needs. See id.
68. Alm, supra note 59, at 1185–86.
69. After one year, HOPE probationers were fifty-five percent less likely
to be arrested for a new crime, seventy-two percent less likely to use drugs,
sixty-one percent less likely to skip appointments with their probation officer,
and fifty-three percent less likely to have their probation revoked. “Swift and
Certain” Sanctions in Probation Are Highly Effective: Evaluation of the HOPE
Program, NAT’L. INST. JUST. (Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Swift and Certain],
http://www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/community/drug-offenders/Pages/hawaii
-hope.aspx.
70. See Leshner, supra note 19, at 46 (“If [addicts] have a brain disease,
imprisoning them without treatment is futile. If they are left untreated, their
recidivism rates to both crime and drug use are frighteningly high . . . .”).
71. See Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 37, at 41; Swift and Certain, supra note 69.
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II. ATTEMPTS TO INTEGRATE KNOWLEDGE OF
SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER AND DETERRENCE
PRINCIPLES INTO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Recently, there has been significant reform in the administration of sanctions in both probation and problem-solving
72
courts. Section A analyzes the use of graduated sanctions in
probation, illustrated through Project HOPE. Section A concludes that although Project HOPE should inform drug court
procedure, because Project HOPE does not specifically serve offenders suffering from severe substance use disorder, it should
not be the sole model for sanctions in drug courts. Section B
discusses the wide array of sanctions currently used in drug
courts and the ways in which many of those sanctions do not
align with current medical knowledge of severe substance use
disorder.
A. A LESSON FROM PROBATION REFORM
Project HOPE leads the reform movement in traditional
probation. This Section analyzes the extent to which Project
HOPE’s procedures should be incorporated into a model drug
court. Subsection A.1 analyzes swift hearings following court
violations and Subsection A.2 analyzes the extent to which Project HOPE’s deterrence principles apply to a model drug court
population. This Section concludes that swift hearings should
be an essential component of drug court procedures, but sanctions and deterrent principles must be modified to reflect the
drug court population, as opposed to Project HOPE’s general
population.
1. The Importance of Swift and Certain Hearings
Project HOPE’s success is due in part to its integration of
deterrence theory into the probation program. The effectiveness
of sanctions increases with the swiftness and certainty of the
73
sanction. Project HOPE participants receive both swift and
72. See infra Parts II.A, II.B.
73. See Dale A. Parent, Structuring Policies To Address Sanctions for Absconders and Violators, in AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 47, at 7, 10; Harold G.
Grasmick & George J. Bryjak, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of
Punishment, 59 SOC. F. 471, 471 (1980); see also Raymond Paternoster, Decisions To Participate in and Desist from Four Types of Common Delinquency:
Deterrence and the Rational Choice Perspective, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 9
(1989) (“The active decision maker is . . . repeatedly making offending decisions, which may be affected by . . . an ongoing reassessment of sanction
threats.”).
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certain sanctions following violations. The general principle
that guides the warning hearing and swift hearings is con74
sistency. Participants are told at the warning hearing that
75
they “can count on a jail sanction for every violation.” Then,
the general consistent message introduced at the warning hear76
ing is enforced through “swift hearings” —over seventy percent
of hearings are held within seventy-two hours of a detected vio77
lation. At those hearings, probationers are sentenced to a certain amount of time in jail, which increases with each succes78
sive violation. This is starkly different from the traditional
probation response, where probation violations pile up until the
court intervenes with a revocation hearing—a drastic re79
sponse—substantially after the initial violations. Project
HOPE’s swift response and certainty of jail time moved away
from the traditional revocation hearing response, thereby increasing the likelihood of compliance with probation condi80
tions.
Although Project HOPE has been incredibly successful for
populations of offenders that previously violated probation, especially individuals charged with serious felonies, it is not explicitly for individuals suffering from severe substance use dis81
order. Recognizing the need for additional treatment and
supervision for “chronically addicted offenders,” Hawaii has a
separate drug court specifically for individuals with substance
82
use disorder. Therefore, although some procedures in Project
HOPE should inform drug court procedures, it is important to
consider the underlying assumptions guiding the “swift” and
“certain” response and whether those assumptions are as applicable to a drug court population limited to individuals with severe substance use disorder.
74. See Alm, supra note 59, at 1186; Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 57,
at 9.
75. Alm, supra note 59, at 1185 n.13. Those violations include, but are not
limited to, failing a drug test, failing to meet with a probation officer, and not
going to treatment. See, e.g., Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 57, at 56.
76. Alm, supra note 59, at 1185.
77. Id.
78. Swift and Certain, supra note 69.
79. See, e.g., Taxman et al., supra note 45 (“The probation system’s failure
to respond to noncompliant probationers encourages defiance by creating an
environment that tolerates inattention to the importance of adherence to the
release conditions.”).
80. See id. at 183.
81. See Alm, supra note 59, at 1187–88.
82. Id.
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2. The (In)Applicability of Deterrence Principles to
Individuals with Severe Substance Use Disorder
The underlying assumption of deterrence theory—that an
active and rational decision maker makes the choice to re83
offend or use based on a given sanction —does not apply with
the same force to individuals suffering from severe substance
use disorder, who are unable to control the impulse to use a
84
substance in response to certain stimuli. Severe substance use
disorder is characterized by an “impairment in behavioral control, craving, [and] diminished recognition of significant prob85
lems with one’s behavior . . . .” There is a cognitive break
86
down in reasoning that leads to “compulsive” use. Although
Project HOPE participants receive jail time for every viola87
tion, the possibility of one night in jail may not effectively deter an individual suffering from severe substance use disorder
because that individual has less control over the impulse to use
88
depending on the nature of the situation and relevant stimuli.
Additionally, spending time in jail does not treat the underly89
ing addiction and impulse to use drugs. Drug court sanctions
must be implemented so that instead of merely punishing a
person for relapsing—a predictable and compulsive act for an
individual with severe substance use disorder—the sanctions
treat and respond to the chemical addiction, especially during
90
early phases of abstinence.
Project HOPE, however, does not implement “certain”
sanctions solely for their deterrent effect. The other benefit of
83. Cf. Paternoster, supra note 73, at 9 (describing an active decision
maker in the sanction evaluation process).
84. See DSM-V, supra note 19, at 485 (describing an individual with severe substance use as “chronically relapsing” and compulsively taking drugs).
85. See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Addiction Med., supra note 19, at 1.
86. See Steven E. Hyman, The Neurobiology of Addiction: Implications for
Voluntary Control of Behavior, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 8, 9–10 (2007) (discussing
the impact of addictive drugs on the prefrontal cortex and cognitive control).
87. Alm, supra note 59, at 1185 n.13.
88. Cf. Kalivas & O’Brien, supra note 14, at 166 (describing how addictive
drugs impact behavioral responses). That is not to say that jail is never an appropriate sanction. Jail as a potential sanction has been a key component of
the success of drug courts. See ROSSMAN ET AL., THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 86. As discussed in Part III, jail should be used in response to certain violations. See infra Part III.
89. Leshner, supra note 19, at 46 (“[I]f we know that criminals are drug
addicted, it is no longer reasonable to simply incarcerate them. If they have a
brain disease, imprisoning them without treatment is futile.”).
90. See Leshner, supra note 19, at 46.
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certain sanctions is that the certainty of the sanctions increases
91
participants’ perception of a just and fair program. Procedural
justice—the idea that participants are more likely to view the
criminal justice system positively if they believe that their case
was processed in a fair manner—also guides the certainty as92
pect of Project HOPE. This fairness increases compliance with
the program and participants’ positive perception of the pro93
gram. Because drug court participants are likewise more likely to comply if they believe they are being treated in a fair
manner, it is important that the administration of sanctions in
94
drug courts is guided by principles of procedural justice.
Drug courts currently utilize some, but not all, of the pro95
cedures implemented in Project HOPE. There are, however,
elements from Project HOPE that should be integrated into
drug court procedures to produce courts that are more effective.
B. CURRENT PROCEDURES FOR ADMINISTERING SANCTIONS IN
DRUG COURTS
The procedures for administering sanctions vary greatly
among drug courts. However, some general trends can guide a
discussion of drug court sanctions. As is discussed below, the
majority of drug courts do not have a written schedule of sanc96
tions or provide that schedule to participants, do not clearly
differentiate between disease-driven and non-disease-driven
97
acts when administering sanctions, and do not respond to violations as “swiftly” as Project HOPE.

91. See Alm, supra note 59, at 1186.
92. Cf. ROSSMAN ET AL., THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at
84–85 (describing procedural justice).
93. See Alm, supra note 59, at 1186.
94. See ROSSMAN ET AL., THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at
85 (noting that drug court participants are more likely to comply with the program if they believe they are being treated in a fair manner).
95. See, e.g., MINN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, MINNESOTA OFFENDER DRUG
COURT STANDARDS 6–8 (2009), available at http://www.mncourts
.gov/Documents/0/Public/Problem_Solving_Courts/Offender_Drug_Court_Stan
dards_-_031109.pdf (discussing behavioral contract, graduated sanctions, and
swift hearings).
96. See infra Part II.B.1.
97. See infra Part II.B.2.
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1. The Drug Court Contract
Although most drug courts require a written contract to
98
participate, the majority of those contracts do not include a
99
schedule for the administration of sanctions. Written schedules for sanctions are considered a “best practice” for drug
courts, but “just under half of courts have written schedules of
sanctions . . . and, only two-thirds of those that do provide their
100
written schedules to the participants.” By not providing a
“sanction menu” to drug court participants, drug courts are not
ensuring a “certain” response, therefore decreasing the deterrent effect of sanctions and participants’ perception of fair101
ness. Evidence from Project HOPE suggests that the drug
courts with high-predictability sanctions are the most likely to
deter noncompliance with drug court conditions. However, empirical evidence from the Multi-Site Drug Court Evaluation
(MADCE) calls that assumption into question.
Recognizing the array of outcome achievement among drug
courts, the MADCE studied the impact of specific policies and
102
practices on drug court participant outcomes. Data was compiled from the MADCE Adult Drug Court Survey and from interviews with 1,781 offenders across twenty-three drug
103
courts. The MADCE found that medium-predictability sanctions (as opposed to high or low-predictability) have the great104
est impact on reducing crime and subsequent drug use.
105
The study on the predictability of sanctions found statis98. See, e.g., Travis, supra note 54, at 5.
99. See ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 59 (finding that only 44.4% of drug
courts have written schedules for sanctions, and only 67.1% of courts that do
have a sanction menu publish that schedule to drug court participants); see,
e.g., DRUG COURT AGREEMENT, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., available at
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/circuitcourt/resources/files/drugcourtagr
eementrevised.pdf (silent on sanctions).
100. ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
101. See Parent, supra note 73; Harold G. Grasmick & George J. Bryjak,
The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of Punishment, 59 Soc. F. 471, 471
(1980); see also Paternoster, supra note 73, at 9 (“The active decision maker is
repeatedly making offending decisions affected in part by an ongoing reassessment of sanction threats.”).
102. SHELLI B. ROSSMAN ET AL., URBAN INST., 4 THE MULTI-SITE ADULT
DRUG COURT EVALUATION: THE IMPACT OF DRUG COURTS 121–22 (Shelli B.
Rossman et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter ROSSMAN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF DRUG
COURTS]. For additional information on the study’s design methods see id. at
122–24.
103. Id. at 124–25.
104. Id. at 144.
105. Id. at 140.
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tically significant differences between high-, medium-, and lowpredictability sanctions with regard to preventing drug use and
106
criminal behavior. Medium-predictability courts were courts
that formally communicated how and when participants would
be sanctioned for non-compliance but retained some flexibility
107
Both mediumin applying the sanctioning schedule.
predictability and low-predictability courts were over two times
more likely to prevent criminal conduct than high108
And drug courts with mediumpredictability courts.
predictability sanctions outranked both high-predictability and
109
low-predictability courts at preventing substance use. This
suggests that high-predictability sanctions, most similar to the
Project HOPE model, are not the most effective at deterring
crime and substance use with the drug court population. Perhaps this is because medium- and low-predictability sanctions
give the judge greater discretion to account for the medical aspect of violations and factor in medical knowledge to the administration of sanctions. Even given that discretion, mediumpredictability sanctions ensure the judge is accountable to participants and responds within certain published limitations.
2. Differentiating the Sanction Based on the Violation
Recently, drug court scholars have criticized drug courts’
110
responses to certain violations. First, scholars have criticized
drug courts’ response to relapse, the ultimate violation. Relapse
is a daily threat for an addict, even one who has been sober for
111
decades. Some scholars suggest that for individuals with severe substance use disorder, relapse should be a time to give
112
additional support rather than a time to punish. Therefore, in
early stages of a drug court program, relapses should be re113
sponded to with increased treatment, not greater sanctions.
DSM-V classifies an individual as being in early remission if no
106. Id. at 144.
107. Id. at 5.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 144–51.
110. See generally Douglas B. Marlowe, Drug Court Practitioner Fact Sheet,
Behavior Modification 101 for Drug Courts: Making the Most of Incentives and
Sanctions, NAT’L DRUG CT. INST. (Sept. 2012), http://ndcrc.org/sites/default/
files/fact_sheets.pdf.
111. Travis, supra note 54, at 5. Therefore, a common saying in the recovery community is live “a day at a time.” Id.
112. Id.
113. Marlowe, supra note 110, at 5.

FISHER_5fmt

766

11/30/2014 3:24 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:747

criteria for substance use disorder have been met for at least
three months and as being in sustained remission if no criteria
114
have been met for twelve months or longer. Once a participant has more sobriety time and has progressed past early remission, the participant will have more control over their impulse to use, and it may be more appropriate to sanction a
relapse.
Second, scholars have suggested administering sanctions
based on the nature of the violation. For those drug courts that
do provide a sanction menu to their participants, there is no indication that any court explicitly differentiates sanctions based
upon the nature of the violation and its relationship to sub115
stance use disorder. The activities most commonly sanctioned
include: supplying a positive urinalysis; skipping a urinalysis;
skipping treatment, a meeting, or an appointment; attitude;
116
absconding; and receiving new charges. For an individual
with severe substance use disorder in early remission, some of
the listed sanctioned activities may be compulsive or addiction117
driven. For example, supplying a positive urinalysis or committing a new offense while under the influence would mean an
individual has relapsed. But severe substance use disorder is a
brain disease, characterized by a change in circuitry that hin118
ders the ability to control the craving to use. Therefore, punishing relapses may be inappropriate, especially for an individ119
Depending on the participant,
ual in early remission.
situation, and relevant stimuli, it may be impossible to deter a
120
relapse in early recovery in an uncontrolled environment.
Therefore, punishment will not effectively reduce the criminal
behavior and the underlying addiction.

114. DSM-V, supra note 19, at 491. The only criteria that may still be present is having a “craving[ ] or strong desire” to use. Id.
115. This conclusion is based on my search of publicly available Drug Court
contracts and the conclusions of the MADCE.
116. Lindquist et al., supra note 46, at 129.
117. See, e.g., Kalivas & O’Brien, supra note 14, at 166. The National Drug
Institute has recently recommended distinguishing between distal and proximal behavioral goals. Proximal behavioral goals are behaviors a participant is
already capable of and should involve more severe sanctions than distal (longterm) behavioral goals. Marlowe, supra note 110, at 7.
118. See supra Part I.A.
119. See Travis, supra note 54, at 5 (“The moment of relapse is an occasion
to work harder to support the individual offender, not an occasion to shun or
exile him.”).
120. See, e.g., Kalivas & O’Brien, supra note 14, at 166.
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Additionally, independent of the decision to use, individuals with severe substance use disorder satisfy additional criteria—such as the inability to fulfill obligations—that may hinder compliance with drug-court criteria including meeting with
probation officers, supplying urinalyses, and attending court on
121
a regular basis. These non-drug-related behavioral symptoms
should also be addressed therapeutically where necessary, as
opposed to punitively, if they result from the underlying medical condition.
Courts that employ high-predictability sanctions, without
an opportunity to vary the sanction based on the nature of the
violation, lack the flexibility to respond therapeutically, as opposed to solely punitively. Because courts fail to respond therapeutically as necessary—decreasing the probability of abstinence and future criminal conduct—the majority of drug courts
do not fulfill their role in the criminal justice system as effectively as possible and, therefore, are arguably an unnecessary
alternative to traditional probation.
3. Swift and Not-So-Swift Hearings
Although drug courts respond to probation violations more
swiftly than the practice in traditional probation, they still respond less swiftly than recommended by the Project HOPE
model. The majority of Project HOPE participants are brought
122
before the court within seventy-two hours of any violation.
When responding to positive drug tests, forty-eight percent of
drug courts sanction an individual within one week of a violation, whereas forty-one percent wait until the participant’s next
court appearance, which could be anywhere from a few days to
123
a month away. For sanctions for infractions other than positive drug tests, more courts tend to wait until the next court
124
hearing. This delay decreases the deterrence effect of the
sanctions and therefore the efficacy of the drug court.
Drug courts have made substantial strides toward improving probation outcomes for drug offenders, but there is room for
improvement. Drug courts should internalize the lessons from
Project HOPE and apply Project HOPE’s procedure and philosophy to the drug court population. By integrating knowledge of
121. See DSM-V, supra note 19, at 481–84 (listing an inability to fulfill obligations as one criteria of substance use disorder).
122. Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 57, at 13.
123. ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 60.
124. Id. at 61–62.

FISHER_5fmt

768

11/30/2014 3:24 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:747

substance use disorder, deterrence principles, and procedural
justice to the administration of sanctions, drug courts can more
effectively combat addiction and its correlation to criminal activity.
III. INTEGRATING KNOWLEDGE OF SUBSTANCE USE
DISORDER INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS
IN DRUG COURTS
Now that the scientific community has greater knowledge
of the nature of substance use disorder and its impact on behaviors, this knowledge should be incorporated into the administration of sanctions in drug courts. To the extent it is possible
to deter addicts from relapsing or violating conditions of the
court, drug courts should integrate principles of deterrence theory. However, drug courts must also maintain a therapeutic
component and respond in a medically appropriate manner to
violations that result from the disease of substance use disorder. The major areas in which drug court sanction administration should be clarified are the initial behavioral contract and
the sanction menu, which will be discussed in Section A and
Section B, respectively. Section C discusses the impact the proposed contract and sanction menu will have on the appellate
process. Section D concludes by addressing some possible challenges to this Note’s solution and why the proposed procedure
is preferable to those currently utilized by drug courts.
A. THE BEHAVIORAL CONTRACT
The majority of drug courts, similar to Project HOPE, re125
quire a behavioral contract for participation. However, most
contracts do not inform participants of the potential sanctions
126
for violating the contract. By not specifying the potential
sanctions in the contract, drugs courts reduce the deterrent effect of sanctions and decrease the perception of procedural justice in the drug courts.
Sanctions have the greatest deterrent effect if they are cer127
tain. Project HOPE has exemplified that the presence of a
behavioral contract that outlines key sanctions can have a sig128
nificant impact on compliance with probation procedures.
125. ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4. Interestingly, two-thirds of those contracts require a waiver of rights to challenge the procedures. Id.
126. Id. at 5.
127. Taxman et al., supra note 57, at 187.
128. Swift and Certain, supra note 69.
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Currently, the majority of drug courts do not include a sanction
menu similar to Project HOPE. If there is no sanction menu, or
the sanction menu is never shared with drug court participants, participants will not be certain of whether their actions
will result in a sanction. Therefore, they are less likely to be deterred from violating a condition of the drug court where deterrence is more probable. Drug courts should incorporate some
principles from Project HOPE to increase the deterrent effect of
sanctions, specifically the language from the “warning hearing.”
At a Project HOPE warning hearing, the sanctions for violating conditions of probation are clearly communicated to
court participants. The warning hearing includes the following
messages:
129

“I think you can succeed on probation . . . .”
“You are the one responsible for making sure that you comply with
your conditions of probation . . . . [Y]ou are making a deal with me to
130
follow the rules.”
“You are being brought here to court today so I can clearly spell out
what the consequences will be if you don’t follow the rules of proba131
tion.”
“[I]f you fail a drug test, if you fail to meet with your probation officer
when you are supposed to, or you fail with other terms of your probation, such as not getting an assessment, not going to treatment, etc.—
132
you will go to jail.”
“[I]f you violate the rules, there will be consequences, and they will
133
happen right away. But it’s all about choices.”

Participants of Project HOPE are successful in part because
they know the consequences of their actions—they know that
every violation of a probation condition will result in time in
134
jail. The certainty increases both the deterrent effect of the
sanction and the perception of procedural justice because every
participant is subject to the same warning hearing and the
same sanctions. Many of the messages in Project HOPE’s warning hearing should also be conveyed to drug court participants
through the behavioral contract and an initial hearing.
The drug court contract must, however, account for the fact
that it is serving a different population than that present in
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 57, at 56.
Id.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id.
See Alm, supra note 59, at 1186.
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Project HOPE. The sanction menu this Note proposes is designed for drug courts limited to participants with severe substance use disorder and therefore less able to control to impulse
135
to use in early and sustained remission. Although the Project
136
HOPE warning hearing states “it’s all about choices,” research has established that an individual with severe substance use disorder experiences a change in brain chemistry
that affects their ability to make rational choices regarding
137
use. Therefore, a behavioral contract for drug courts should
convey that non-disease-driven violations will be responded to
with a certain sanction (such as a limited amount of jail time).
In contrast, disease-driven violations—or violations that result
from an inability to respond rationally to certain stimuli—will
be responded to with increased therapeutic treatment. A sample behavioral contract for a drug court could include the following language:
I think you can succeed in drug court. You are here to address
both your underlying disease and the criminal behavior that has resulted from that disease. You are responsible for your success and ensuring that you follow the rules of this court.
You are making a deal with me to follow the rules of this court.
You are being brought here today so that I can tell you what the various consequences will be if you do not comply with the conditions of
this court.
However, you are in drug court because you have a medical disease. In order to recover from that disease, you must rewire your
brain chemistry. This can take time. If you violate the conditions of
this drug court because of the compulsive nature of your disease, we
will respond therapeutically. This will likely mean more intensive
treatment and will be based on the recommendation of medical professionals. However, if you are in sustained remission, choose to use
non-compulsively, or violate a condition of this court noncompulsively, you will go to jail.
If you violate a condition of your participation in this court, there
will be a response. It may be a sanction or it may be increased therapy. But either way it will happen right away. The responses of this
court will be based on your choices and actions.

This sample contract is modeled after the warning hearing
138
administered to Project HOPE participants, but accounts for
the fact that drug courts serve individuals who are suffering
from a disease and have less control over certain choices in the
early phases of the drug court program and recovery. There135.
136.
137.
138.

See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 57, at 57.
See supra Part I.A.
See Hawken & Kleinman, supra note 57, at 56–58.
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fore, instead of referring to relapse consequences as sanctions—
implying that the participant has done something wrong—
relapse consequences are referred to as therapeutic responses.
This semantic distinction accounts for scientific literature that
addicted individuals cannot control the urge to use in response
139
to certain stimuli, and so the court response to disease-driven
violations should be distinct from the court response to nondisease-driven violations.
The sample contract also aligns with the best practices
140
found in the MADCE study. Courts with high-predictability
sanctions have a sanction menu, publish the menu to partici141
pants, and the menu is (almost) always followed by the judge.
High-predictability courts are most similar to Project HOPE
142
but were less effective with the drug court population. By
contrast, medium-predictability courts, or courts that had a
sanction menu but either did not publish the sanction menu or
allowed the judge greater discretion when administering sanc143
tions, were the most effective. Therefore, the behavioral contract should be classified as “medium predictability” and state
that non-disease-driven violations will be responded to with a
specific, limited sanction, whereas the judge will have more
discretion when responding to disease-driven violations.
Having a transparent contract will also increase the perception of procedural justice among drug court participants.
Drug court participants are more likely to comply with the program if they feel as though they are being treated in a fair and
144
consistent manner. The behavioral contract makes clear that
every non-disease-driven violation will be responded to with a
sanction. In a study, the threat of jail was found the most effec145
tive sanction by both court participants and staff. Therefore,
similar to findings by Project HOPE, jail is the most appropriate sanction for those behaviors that can be deterred and do not
require a therapeutic response. The study likewise found that
139. See, e.g., Kalivas & O’Brien, supra note 14, at 166.
140. The MADCE study discussed in Part II.B found that highpredictability sanctions were less effective than both medium-predictability
and low-predictability sanctions at preventing relapse and criminal activity.
See supra notes 102–09 and accompanying text.
141. See ROSSMAN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF DRUG COURTS, supra note 102, at
140, 144.
142. Id. at 144–51.
143. Id.
144. ROSSMAN ET AL., THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 85.
145. Lindquist et al., supra note 46, at 132.
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the majority of participants thought sanctions should be tai146
lored to the individual. The contract accounts for that individualization by granting more flexibility with regard to disease-driven violations. The behavioral contract should go on to
clarify what the specific sanctions and therapeutic responses
may be, in order to bolster both its deterrent effect and the perception of procedural justice.
B. DIFFERENTIATING COURT RESPONSES BASED ON THE
NATURE OF THE VIOLATION
The behavioral contract should also outline the specific
sanctions and therapeutic responses to various violations of
drug court conditions. When the consequences are outlined,
participants are more likely to be deterred from violating drugcourt conditions—because the consequences are certain—and
are also more likely to view the drug court as fair.
1. The Disease-Driven v. Non-Disease-Driven Distinction
Currently, the majority of drug courts do not distinguish
between therapeutic responses and sanctions for court violations in their behavioral contract. For example, the majority of
147
drug courts “sanction” every positive urinalysis. But punishing an individual with severe substance use disorder for a predictable manifestation of their disease does not align with the
medical community’s knowledge of addiction and what behaviors are capable of being deterred. Instead, drug court consequences should be divided into two categories—disease-driven
and non-disease-driven violations. This distinction would address the underlying tension between punishing the “sick” ad148
dict and punishing the “criminal” offender. Recognizing this
distinction would also increase the likelihood of participant
success in drug court programs because many behavioral goals
149
are unattainable in early recovery. Drug courts should support the struggling addict, as opposed to merely punishing the
violation, thereby enhancing the therapeutic component of the
program and the likelihood of recovery for participants.
Whether a violation is disease-driven or non-disease-driven
should be medically determined. In determining whether an act
146. Id. at 133.
147. ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 60.
148. See Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 37, at 36.
149. Cf. Marlowe, supra note 110, at 5 (explaining that substancedependent individuals need time and effort to achieve sustained sobriety).
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was disease-driven, the medical professional member of the
drug court team would assess whether the act was compul150
sive. The medical professional would consider similar criteria
to that used in diagnosing severe substance use disorder, including whether there was a strong craving, whether the violation was in response to a stimuli that is associated with use,
and whether the substance use was chosen over an important
151
social or occupational activity. Because the drug court team
includes treatment providers, the treatment provider should
make a recommendation, based on their medical judgment to
152
the judge as to whether the violation was disease-driven. This
procedure will not only clarify the roles of various members of
the drug court team but will also ensure drug courts are responding medically where necessary—an essential reason justifying their development as an alternative to traditional probation. The next question that arises is what those various
therapeutic responses should be.
2. Possible Therapeutic and Punitive Responses
Most drug courts provide a range of treatment modalities,
ranging from inpatient treatment to counseling and relapse
153
prevention. For repeated disease-driven violations, participants should be warned that they will be moved to a more intensive treatment regimen. For example, someone in counseling would move to outpatient treatment, and someone in
outpatient treatment would move to inpatient treatment. The
fact that the increase in treatment would be judicially coerced
154
does not undermine the effectiveness of the treatment. Intensifying the treatment regimen would both serve as a judicial
response to court violations and ensure the participant is getting the level of treatment they need to abstain from using. In
early remission, abstinence may need to be coerced via a controlled environment, and responding therapeutically will give

150. Cf. Hyman, supra note 86, at 9 (stating that modern definitions of addiction focus on issue of voluntarily control and compulsive use).
151. See DSM-V, supra note 19, at 491.
152. See, e.g., ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 8. Typically, the entire drug
court team, including the judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, treatment liaison, and drug court program provider, determines sanctions. Lindquist et al.,
supra note 46, at 139–40. The judge, however, has the final say in what sanction will be administered. Id.
153. See, e.g., ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4, 48–53.
154. ROSSMAN ET AL., THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 45.
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the court the tools it needs to ensure it provides optimal therapeutic responses as necessary.
However, before the serious consequence of intensifying
treatment regimens, the court and treatment provider should
have greater flexibility in administering therapeutic consequences. Other therapeutic responses could include writing a
letter of apology or essay, journaling, a life skills assignment,
community service, observing a victim impact panel, or visiting
155
a morgue. Each of those therapeutic responses would educate
the participant about the underlying nature of their substance
use disorder and help change the participant’s response to be156
havioral and social cues that previously triggered using. The
behavioral contract should list these possible consequences and
the ultimate therapeutic consequence of increasing the treatment regimen.
Jail should not be the presumed response to disease-driven
violations. Jail is currently the most common sanction adminis157
tered in drug courts, followed by increased treatment. However, as discussed above, jail does not treat the underlying ad158
diction or change brain chemistry. And, depending on the
stimuli and environment leading to relapse, jail will not effec159
tively deter an individual in early remission from using.
Therefore, jail should be reserved as a sanction for those violations that are non-disease-driven, not as a therapeutic response
to relapse in early remission.
Although the consequences for violations will not be as
“certain” as those for Project HOPE participants because it will
vary based on the participant’s therapeutic needs, all participants will know that there will be a response to disease-driven
violations by the court, including relapse. That response will be
based on a medical recommendation and tailored to the individual participant. Further, the response will address their un-

155. These possible therapeutic responses are derived from a list of sanctions provided by the National Drug Court Research Center. They are all
listed as sanctions, not as therapeutic responses. Each of these sanctions is
considered low or moderate severity. See List of Incentives and Sanctions, supra note 51.
156. See Leshner, supra note 19, at 46 (noting that treatment must not only treat the disease, but also behavioral and social cues).
157. Lindquist et al., supra note 46, at 130 (listing sanctions from most to
least common).
158. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Kalivas & O’Brien, supra note 14, at 166.
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derlying medical condition. This uniformity will enhance the
perception of procedural justice.
Non-disease-driven violations can be addressed more uniformly in the behavioral contract. Responses to non-diseasedriven violations should be referred to as sanctions, to distinguish them from the therapeutic responses discussed above.
Sanctions should be presumed for individuals in sustained remission or for non-disease-driven violations. Because drug
court participants in sustained remission act more rationally
than compulsively, deterrence theory and Project HOPE should
guide the sanction menu. Therefore, those sanctions should be
certain, administered swiftly, and progressive. Because jail is
the most effective deterrent, similar to Project HOPE every
voluntary violation should be sanctioned with a brief time in
160
jail. This sanction should be included in the initial behavioral
contract.
The responses must also be swift. The majority of Project
HOPE participants are brought before the court within seventy-two hours of violations, whereas the same cannot be said of
161
drug court participants. To improve the efficacy of sanctions,
the hearings should be held as soon as possible or at least with162
Waitin the seventy-two hour period used by Project HOPE.
ing until the next court appearance, perhaps a month or more
away, will not maximize court efficacy or sufficiently differentiate drug courts from traditional probation.
These distinctions should be incorporated into the behavioral contract discussed above. The behavioral contract should
clearly outline the responses to various violations and set limitations on judicial discretion. The contract should state that the
court will respond differently to violations that are diseasedriven and non-disease-driven, and violations by individuals in
early remission versus sustained remission or remission. The
contract should also state what those responses will be to a certain extent but leave room for therapeutic modifications based
on the needs of the participants. A model behavioral contract
could include the following language:
160. See Lindquist et al., supra note 46, at 132.
161. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
162. This will of course add additional burdens on the court system and
could be a source of criticism. However, my proposal is limited to those drug
courts that serve individuals with severe substance use disorder. By limiting
the number of participants drug courts serve—and serving only those who
need the therapeutic component the most—drug courts could more effectively
use their resources and reduce the cost of the programs.
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You are in drug court because you are addicted to a substance. In
this court, we want to help treat that underlying addiction so that you
can become sober, a productive member of society, and stop committing crimes. However, we recognize that in early recovery complete
abstinence is not always possible. You have a chemical response in
your brain that reduces your ability to control using. If you violate the
terms of this program because of that underlying chemical response,
we will respond therapeutically, based on the recommendation of the
treatment provider. That response may include: writing a letter of
apology or essay, journaling, a life skills assignment, community service, observing a victim impact panel, or visiting a morgue. If you continue to violate conditions as a result of your substance use disorder,
we will increase your treatment regimen.
However, your disease does not insulate you from responsibility
for your behaviors. If you violate a condition of this court noncompulsively, you will go to jail, at first for one night and for increasingly longer periods of time for additional violations (up to a prede163
termined limit). Also, once you have been symptom-free for twelve
months and are in remission, you will have more tools to control the
desire to use. If you use at that point, you will be sent to jail. Between
three and twelve months there will be a presumption you could control the desire to use—although a medical professional may rebut that
presumption—and you will likewise be sent to jail for using. Whether
you are able to control your consumption will be based on the recommendation of your treatment provider and on your remission status.

This model behavioral contract would go on to include a
sanction menu, outlining the various sanctions and therapeutic
responses of the drug court. By stating that violations for nondisease-driven acts will result in jail time, the court will deter
those behaviors that are most readily deterred. Also, because
jail time is a sanction administered to every person for nondisease-driven violations, the process will be viewed as fair and
participants will be more likely to comply with the conditions of
the court.
The contract also differentiates between disease-driven
and non-disease-driven violations and therefore clarifies the
dueling roles of the drug court: treating the addiction and punishing the offender. The participant will be informed that the
court does not intend to punish him or her for acts that directly
result from severe substance use disorder—a medical illness he
163. It is important that the court sets a limit on the number of days spent
in jail. There are horror stories of drug courts that send people to jail as a
sanction and leave them in jail for longer than they would have been held if
they had been sentenced in a traditional court. See This American Life: Very
Tough Love, supra note 53. These stories undermine the validity of the drug
courts and their ability to therapeutically respond to offenders. This Note
would tentatively recommend a maximum jail limit of thirty days as a sanction, prior to considering expulsion from drug court.
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or she cannot control in certain situations. Instead, the court
wants to help treat the addiction. There is less need for uniformity in therapeutic responses because the behavior is not
capable of being deterred and treatment must be tailored to the
individual. However, the procedure will likely be viewed as fair
because every participant will receive a therapeutic response
for disease-driven violations, leading up to a more intense
treatment regimen.
C. APPELLATE REVIEW
A final benefit of the behavioral contract is that it provides
clear guiding principles for appellate courts that are reviewing
the decisions of drug courts. As mentioned before, appellate
courts are currently wary to question the judgments of drug
court judges regarding sanctions and court termination. For
example, the Supreme Court of South Carolina stated that it
has no authority to “evaluate and assess the manner in which
the [drug court] administrators execute the rules and regula164
Other courts have questioned
tions of the [drug court].”
165
whether therapeutic decisions need to be on the record or if
participants are guaranteed the minimal due process protec166
tions of revocation hearings. Some drug court contracts even
require participants to relinquish all rights to an appeal or
167
challenge of any court processes. Appellate courts’ wariness
to question the decisions of drug courts stems in part from the
lack of guiding principles regarding sanctions and court termination.
This Note’s solution provides both drug courts and appellate courts with the tools to ensure procedural justice for participants and adequate review on appeal. First, the drug court
will be constrained by the sanctions limited in the behavior
contract. Second, therapeutic responses must be documented by
the opinion of the medical professional on the drug court team.
Because sanctioning decisions will have to be grounded in a
medical determination, appellate courts will be able to deter164. State v. Perkins, 661 S.E.2d 366, 367 (S.C. 2008).
165. E.g., In re Tyler T., 781 N.W.2d 922, 925 n.15 (Neb. 2010) (citing
Torres v. Berbary, 340 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2003); Harris v. Commonwealth, 689
S.E.2d 713 (Va. 2010); State v. Rogers, 170 P.3d 881 (Idaho 2007); People v.
Anderson, 833 N.E.2d 390 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); State v. Cassill–Skilton, 94 P.3d
407 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)).
166. Barrickman v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-000890-MR, 2006 WL
73464, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2006).
167. See ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 76.
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mine whether the sanction or therapeutic response was appropriate, based on the record, the behavioral contract, the sanction menu, and a consideration of the underlying purposes of
rehabilitation and crime prevention.
Drug court behavioral contracts should outline the expectations for participants and the possible sanctions that will be
administered. However, the contract should also distinguish
between sanctions and therapeutic responses and give examples of possible drug court responses in each of those categories.
Such a contract will deter where deterrence is possible, uphold
the underlying purposes of treating addiction and reducing
crime, increase the perception of procedural justice by drug
court participants, and provide appellate courts with specific
guidance when reviewing drug court case dispositions.
D. SOME POTENTIAL CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES TO THOSE
CONCERNS
The solution proposed by this Note is subject to two distinct but interconnected concerns. The first issue is that it is
hard to determine whether an act is disease- or non-diseasedriven, and this solution will not add clarity or consistency to
the current system. Building on the first concern, the second
concern is that the implementation of therapeutic responses, as
opposed to punitive responses, will allow offenders to abuse the
system and fail to change their behaviors.
The first possible criticism is that a medical professional
will be unable to determine whether an action is disease-driven
or non-disease-driven. This concern, however, may have carried
more weight prior to the implementation of DSM-V. DSM-V
lists eleven specific actions that constitute symptoms of sub168
stance use disorder. Assuming that the disease model correctly captures addiction, medical professionals should be able to
apply the DSM-V criteria for substance use disorder to determine whether a violation was disease-driven. The medical professional may first consider whether the violation falls within
one of the eleven categories, and then consider whether the response was due to a certain stimuli that is associated with using. A certain amount of subjectivity will be inherent in any diagnosis regarding a brain disorder, but that does not mean that
a medical professional is unable to make those classifications,

168. See DSM-V, supra note 19, at 481–84.
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especially with the clear criteria and guidance provided by
DSM-V.
The second criticism is grounded in the concern that responding therapeutically to court violations will “encourage[]
the abdication of individual responsibility for outrageous con169
duct.” A non-punitive response allows behavior that would
normally be classified as criminal conduct, such as violating a
condition of probation by using, to go unpunished. In considering the concern, it is important to first note that under this
Note’s proposal not all violations are responded to therapeutically. Therapeutic responses will only be administered for those
behaviors that directly result from the compulsive nature of severe substance use disorder. All other violations will be responded to with a swift and punitive response. This criticism is
also based on the faulty premise that individuals with severe
substance use disorder are responsible for, or able to control, all
their actions. This premise has been rejected in DSM-V, which
discusses the genetic and neurobiological components of sub170
stance use disorder, and therefore discounts the assumption
that the decision to use can be encouraged or discouraged in all
situations. This Note’s proposal will hold individuals responsible for their behavior when it is appropriate to do so—when
there is a non-disease-driven violation of drug court conditions.
Furthermore, it is important to note that there may come a
point at which an individual is unable to comply with the conditions of the court, or abstain, to the point that it undermines
public safety. As noted above, both rehabilitation and public
safety are guiding jurisprudential foundations for drug
171
courts. At that point, the court may determine that the needs
for public safety outweigh the potential for rehabilitation and
terminate the individual’s participation in drug court. Although
the termination procedures are beyond the scope of this Note,
the solution does not suggest that rehabilitation and treatment
must come above the need for public safety. Instead, the two
should be pursued contemporaneously where possible. This
Note concedes that eventually a drug court may determine that
treatment is no longer a feasible option. However, in keeping
with the principles of procedural justice, it is important that if
such a determination is made, it is based on the countervailing
169. Peele, supra note 15, at 21; see also Hanson, supra note 15 (arguing
that the disease model provides an excuse for poor behavior).
170. See DSM-V, supra note 19, at 494.
171. See ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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purposes of the drug court and is reviewable by an appellate
172
court. By clarifying the standards for administering sanctions, or the ultimate sanction of drug court termination, appellate courts will have the tools needed to review court decisions
and ensure court participants are treated fairly and in a manner consistent with procedural justice.
CONCLUSION
People addicted to substances were historically viewed as
173
“weak” and unwilling to lead moral lives. Science has since
taught us that addiction is a chronic and progressive disease
characterized by an inability to control substance use. Research
has also shown that addiction leads to crime. Drug courts
emerged to address both the underlying disease of substance
use disorder and the criminal behavior that manifests from
that disease. Currently, however, the majority of drug courts do
not clearly distinguish these two purposes when responding to
drug court violations.
Drug courts should clarify their procedures for administering sanctions. Knowledge of substance use disorder, deterrence
theory, and procedural justice should guide responses to violations. The responses should be included in a behavioral contract that is administered at the beginning of drug court participation. The contract should distinguish between therapeutic
responses to disease-driven violations, such as the recently sober addict who cannot yet control the impulse to use in response to certain stimuli, and sanctions for non-disease-driven
violations. In moments of relapse, especially in early remission,
the addicted participant should be supported and medically responded to, not punished for his or her underlying disease and
compulsive behavior. Whereas for non-disease-driven violations, jail should be administered as a sanction in order to most
effectively deter those violations and increase the perception of
fairness among in drug court participants.
Sanctions need to be clarified in drug courts. This Note’s
recommendation for responding to drug court violations would
most effectively balance and uphold the therapeutic and punitive components of drug court, leading to a safer society with
172. But cf. State v. Perkins, 661 S.E.2d 366, 367 (S.C. 2008) (stating that
the state supreme court has no authority to “evaluate and assess the manner
in which the [drug court] administrators execute the rules and regulations of
the [drug court]”).
173. Leshner, supra note 19, at 45.
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less crime committed by individuals suffering from severe substance use disorder.

